finem respice

The [Negative] Net Present Value of Cute

Submitted by ep on Mon, 08/02/2010 - 04:55
'get cute' attempt number one

Long ago at the tail end of some question and answer period for some legal lecture or another, some young, bright student (almost certainly on the way to a masters degree in Computer Science) posited the import of some elegant and beautiful technical loophole, the details of which have long since become eroded by the ravages of bit rot in this author's long term memory, that threatened the legitimacy of a large body of intellectual property law. The speaker paused thoughtfully, squinted for a few seconds and replied with something resembling, "That is one of the more interesting and creative constructions I've heard on the subject. It is as unique as it is useless. It is simply... too cute." What followed was an almost chaotic exchange as a number of other members in the audience panned the speaker's interpretation as anything from unconstitutional to unethical to unjust and just about all points in between. "This," replied the speaker finally, "is why geeks, and I count myself among your number, should be required to take a semester of Civil Procedure. Whatever notions you have absorbed by virtue of spending your formative years watching LA Law or The Practice, be rid of them. Not only do courts have no patience for cute, technically correct but highly disruptive legal theories involving technologies they barely understand, but the ultimate arbiter of whether the facts suggest that the defendant violated Title X Section Y of this or that statute is probably going to be a group of twelve people who lack the wherewithal to get out of jury duty."

In summary: Don't get cute.

This little ditty applies rather more directly when the matter involves issues of unparalleled weight and import to, for instance, the United States.

Entertainingly, a number of commentators, including Ann Woolner (who despite being the "Legal Affairs Columnist" for Bloomberg seems to apply no legal analysis to the Wikileaks- or any other affairs- in her columns) have gotten awfully cute in predicting exactly what sort of immunity (if any) Wikileaks enjoys with respect to its recent and not so recent dissemination of classified information.1

Despite these works, it doesn't appear that any commentators have applied the specific facts (or such of them as are publicly known) surrounding the Wikileaks disclosures to anything like a detailed legal analysis. The fact is that arguments substantially resembling "Oh, the press is protected, remember the Pentagon Papers case back in the 1970s?" are simply too cute by half. Wikileaks may, in fact, be in far deeper water than anyone has bothered to realize.

The Statutory Constructs Protecting Classified Information

The general statutory corpus that outlines criminal liability related to the disposition of classified information originates with the Espionage Act of 1917.2 18 USC § 793(a) restricts the collection of "information respecting the national defense," while 18 USC § 793(b) restricts the theft, receipt or copying of "anything connected with the national defense."

Generally, the statute is considered to protect the press from liability by requiring the "intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation."3 18 USC § 793(c) goes further, imposing liability for anyone who:

...receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter....4

But the most onerous section of the statute for the purposes of "press" liability is likely 18 USC § 793(e) that provides:

Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it....5

It will be noticed that specific intent to cause injury to the United States or advantage to any foreign nation is not required by this section. Rather it is mere possession, communication or the attempt to communicate such information as "could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation" that is sufficient to trigger liability. This section was, of course, the nexus of dispute in the Pentagon Papers case.6

The scope of the statute does not end there either. 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) outlines liability for co-conspirators:

If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.7

This last provision is especially onerous for the collection of classified data by media and quasi-media entities, and is mostly echoed by 18 U.S.C. § 794(c). In the view of one scholar: of the central issues that may surface in a future prosecution of the press under the Espionage Act is inchoate liability—whether the reporters are liable either as co-conspirators, or for aiding and abetting the individuals who provided the protected information. Because such liability would attach to the possession of information, and not to its publication, the potential protections of the First Amendment’s Press Clause are, at a minimum, not as clearly established and may not provide much of a defense at all. To the contrary, “[w]hile the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes recognized that ‘without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,’ the Court has yet to explicitly afford special protections to the newsgathering process.” Thus, even though the First Amendment might provide protection from restraints on publication, including, perhaps, after-the-fact criminal prosecution, there is simply no precedent for the proposition that the First Amendment provides any defense to illicit acts of gathering the news, especially when the story never makes it into print.8

The Espionage Act is certainly not the only statutory construct providing potential liability in similar circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 641 provides:

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or


Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted....9

And, of course, "thing of value" applies quite neatly to classified information.

Perhaps decidedly relevant to Wikileaks are 18 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 1924 that both bear on the unauthorized publication of diplomatic correspondence by government employees which, when combined with the sort of inchoate liability courts seem readily able to attach to similar statutes, could easily trigger liability for "press reporting on encrypted communications between the United States and foreign governments or its overseas missions."10 It seems clear that at least one if not over one hundred thousand diplomatic cables PFC Bradley Manning purportedly claimed to have appropriated would trigger these statutes, perhaps irrespective of the Press Clause, if the material were published.

In isolation, these statutory references would seem poised to give any legal counsel advising Wikileaks or its increasingly imperiled founder Mr. Assange a bit of weighty, pregnant pause. However, the addition of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 198211 (hereinafter the "IIPA") might be enough to send a chill through the central nervous system of such professional advisory corps as presently hold the unenviable station of "Wikileaks counsel of record." The IIPA was, of course, the pivot point of the "Valerie Plame affair." 50 U.S.C. § 421(c) provides:

Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United States....12

The astute finem respice reader will quickly notice that this section applies to "Whoever... discloses any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information...." (emphasis added).13 That is, liability under this section is not limited to individuals who were initially authorized to possess the information in question, nor does it require publication.

Press Immunity and the Definition of "Press"

All of this points to an uncomfortable bit of ambiguity in the statutory latticework that comprises liability (and particularly inchoate liability) for the press during the pre-publication phase of the reporting cycle. Specifically:

And inasmuch as the reporters may not be directly liable for removing or disclosing the classified national security information at issue, theories of inchoate liability would open the door to criminal liability where the the reporter played any role in encouraging or otherwise facilitating the disclosure. The unfortunate ambiguity of the relevant statutes creates the real problem in these cases; it is at least plausible to and a violation of these provisions by even the most well- intentioned (and passive) reporters.14

Of course, the analysis does not stop at questions of statutory liability. Even clear-cut liability must still be parsed through a filter of First Amendment protections. The surface contours of the liability event horizon for these cases is defined in large part by Bartnicki v. Vopper15 which appears to carve out of the protective First Amendment bosom a pound of flesh defined thusly: would be frivolous to assert—and no one does in these cases—that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news.16

Bartnicki, which dealt with the repeated rebroadcast of an illegally intercepted phone call by a radio station, outlined the beginnings of three criteria required by the media to avail itself of protection from prosecution. First, the fact that the radio station here had played no role in the illegal interception itself, and, in fact, only learned of it after the illegal act of interception. Second, that after the illegal interception the radio station had obtained the recording lawfully. Third, that the content of the recording was a matter of public concern.

Vladeck compares Bartnicki to the so called "Daily Mail principle"17 citing Justice Marshall's explanation in The Florida Star v. B.J.F18 in support. He concludes:

Fairly read, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, culminating with Bartnicki, suggests that the First Amendment would only protect the dissemination of illegally intercepted information in cases with analogous facts, where the media had clean hands, and where the countervailing privacy interest was comparatively minor. Such cases are, to be sure, difficult to find.19

In fact, Vladeck goes even further, summarizing his case law analysis with:

Thus, the First Amendment probably does not protect journalists and other news gatherers from violating the Espionage Act through the act of newsgathering itself. So long as the retention of classified national security information is itself unlawful, and so long as the reporters are being punished not for the act of publication itself, but for the unlawful gathering of secret information, it is impossible to find any precedent in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that would recognize a First Amendment defense.20

Choosing One's Prosecutorial Battles

Of course, the presence of technical liability under the relevant statutes and the absence of First Amendment protections from that liability are not the end of the argument. The wide swath of prosecutorial discretion, and the political elements that inevitably play into any public prosecution of a media outlet for such liability play an important role in outlining the effective liability for leakers and their cohorts. Even in the event, say, a reporter at the Washington Post may have clearly triggered criminal liability by, for example, stealing classified documents during a visit to offices in the Department of Justice, prosecuting that reporter and taking on the Washington Post would necessarily entail such a public and messy affair as to provide a strong deterrent effect on the administration. In this context it should suffice to say that a strong "choose your battles" element likely precedes these sorts of decisions.

This brings us to the instant facts and the question of Wikileaks and Julian Assange.

The first question is, obviously, have Wikileaks or Mr. Assange triggered criminal liability under the shadow of the relevant statutory umbra? Beneath that analysis it is possible to segment the question into two phases, namely:

The collection and receipt of information, and;
The publication of information.

A media organization in the act of publishing would appear to be at its strongest with respect to constitutional protections. Accordingly, a deep analysis of these issues is beyond the purview of this work.

The collection and receipt prongs, however, would appear to be daunting.

As discussed supra, press protection against criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)-(b) presupposes the absence of "intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." This presumption, however, seems to be more of an informal grant to the press, insofar as courts are likely to assume (recent evidence notwithstanding) that, for instance, the New York Times is not possessed of the intent or reason to believe that the information it publishes is to be used "to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." But what of cases where the party collecting, receiving or possessing said information has expressly indicated such a motivation- be they press or otherwise?

On this point Assange himself is his, and Wikileaks' own worst enemy. Consider these passages from Der Spiegel:

SPIEGEL: You could have started a company in Silicon Valley and lived in a home in Palo Alto with a swimming pool. Why did you decide to do the WikiLeaks project instead?


Assange: We all only live once. So we are obligated to make good use of the time that we have and to do something that is meaningful and satisfying. This is something that I find meaningful and satisfying. That is my temperament. I enjoy creating systems on a grand scale, and I enjoy helping people who are vulnerable. And I enjoy crushing bastards. So it is enjoyable work.21

This comment, of course, merely is one of many of the same flavor that Assange has made in public for quotation. One wonders what damning material might become available to a prosecutor with broad subpoena powers.

Moreover, documents like Assange's own (and once anonymous) "Conspiracy as Governance," provide an early roadmap to his motivations. The paper contains quotations from Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli bordered with passages like:

Authoritarian regimes create forces which oppose them by pushing against a people’s will to truth, love and self-realization. Plans which assist authoritarian rule, once discovered, induce further resistance. Hence such schemes are concealed by successful authoritarian powers until resistance is futile or outweighed by the efficiencies of naked power. This collaborative secrecy, working to the detriment of a population, is enough to define their behavior as conspiratorial.22


When we look at an authoritarian conspiracy as a whole, we see a system of interacting organs, a beast with arteries and veins whose blood may be thickened and slowed until it falls, stupefied; unable to sufficiently comprehend and control the forces in its environment.23

In short, Mr. Assange has any number of potentially adverse writings that may tend to illuminate his motivations as something just a bit more caustic than "the public good."

Of course, words attributed to PFC Bradley Manning don't help much either:

Hillary Clinton, and several thousand diplomats around the world are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one morning, and find an entire repository of classified foreign policy is available, in searchable format, to the public....24

This seems just a bit bloodthirsty for "the public good" defense.

The Limits of Cute "Public Good" Arguments

It further erodes the case that an entity is entitled to First Amendment protection when it releases classified information that is in fact of little or no public interest. In this context, to the extent that releasing the name of Valerie Elise Plame Wilson was a borderline case in the question of clear public interest in the famous Weapons of Mass Destruction National Intelligence Estimate ("NIE") quagmire, it is difficult to imagine how the name, village name, names of family members and even GPS coordinates of Afghan informers could possibly constitute information that was in the "public interest" to release. It may occur to always skeptical finem respice readers that a Venn diagram of those individuals who howled for blood after the Plame disclosure and those individuals who now casually dismiss the Wikileaks disclosures with an effete flourish of the left hand would prove illustrative.

Of course, one can always deny willingly releasing such data. Mr. Assange has wanted it both ways in this circumstance, insisting first that the release was inadvertent, and then issuing an affirmative defense that those Afghani exposed were themselves deserving of their involuntary outing:

Mr Assange told The Times many Afghan informants, including those whose details had been potentially disclosed, were "telling soldiers false stories . . . creating victims themselves".25

But even if it were inadvertent, the standard for liability under 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) doesn't contemplate intent, requiring instead only possession of data that:

...the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.... (emphasis added).26

Hints From the General Counsels of Major Publications?

It is quite illuminating that former "journalistic partners" (in the words of Wikileaks) have begun to distance themselves from Assange and Wikileaks in the wake of the larger disclosures.

"...we're not in any kind of partnership or collaboration with him," said Eric Schmitt, one of the New York Times reporters on the case. Bill Keller, Schmitt's top editor, soon weighed in, too.


"Assange released the information to three mainstream news organisations because we had the wherewithal to mine the data for news and analysis. I think the public interest was served by that. However, his decision to release the data to everyone had potential consequences that I think anyone, regardless of how he views the war, would find regrettable."27

This last bit of language sounds suspiciously crafted by the General Counsel's office of the New York Times, an organization quite aware of the surface area of its First Amendment protection in national security cases, and is, therefore, particularly daunting for Assange.

The contrast between publication approaches taken by, on the on hand, The New York Times, the Guardian and Der Spiegel and, on the other hand, Wikileaks is stark. Clint Hendler posted a review of the "behind the scenes" process for the Columbia Journalism Review last month. The piece also disabuses the "journalistic collaboration" angle since adopted by Assange:

"I’ve seen Julian Assange in the last couple of days kind of flouncing around talking about this collaboration like the four of us were working all this together,” says [New York Times Reporter Eric] Schmitt. ”But we were not in any kind of partnership or collaboration with him. This was a source relationship. He’s making it sound like this was some sort of journalistic enterprise between WikiLeaks, The New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel, and that’s not what it was."28

Indeed, all the papers have been seeking to call Assange a "source":

"There’s a really interesting collaboration between the three news organizations. But Julian, he’s a source," says [The Guardian's Nick] Davies. "All three media organization interviewed him in order to be able to write a profile of him, explain various things about the material, challenge him on various points. So he was there for that function."29

This is not mere ego. In the context of criminal liability, this move makes perfect sense. To the extent Assange is "just a source," then the conspiracy and related provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 793 do not apply to media organizations that did not take part in the illegal acquisition of this data. At the very least this suggests these media organizations are keenly aware of the potential transdermal toxicity Assange is carrying around with him. This sort of thing probably didn't help:

[Der Spiegel's John] Goetz and Davies also say they had conversations with Assange encouraging him to be careful about the lethal harm that could come to people identified in the logs if he released certain documents unredacted.30

Wikileaks has, of course, turned on the The New York Times and the Washington Post in recent weeks. Most notably in the case of The New York Times, for consulting with the White House before publication of the Afghanistan material, an act which caused Assange to call The New York Times "pusillanimous and unprofessional."31 Suffice it to say, it would likely not be particularly difficult to demonstrate that Wikileaks bears very little resemblance to the traditional sort of media entity that enjoys the protection of the First Amendment with respect to the collection, possession and publication of classified material.

Direct Liability as a Co-Conspirator

Moreover, one wonders if Assange and Wikileaks might not have triggered criminal liability by participating directly in the theft of embassy cables and other classified material via its assistance to PFC Bradley Manning. At the very least, Adrian Lamo, who originally blew the whistle on Manning to federal agents, appears to think so. To wit:

I’m all the more angry at the fact that I really do believe Manning was guided by—and to an extent, manipulated by—WikiLeaks.32

Lamo said he doubts Manning had the technical savvy to copy all the data on his own. He thinks Manning received help from hackers in the area who provided him with encryption software to send the classified information to WikiLeaks, and who helped him ensure those leaks were featured prominently on the website.


“Manning’s a bright, young man, but he didn’t have the technical or political expertise to pull this off,’’ Lamo said in a telephone interview. “He had to depend on people state-side.’’


Lamo said those in the area who he says helped Manning all work in the information security area, oppose the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have ties to WikiLeaks. “For Manning to have almost a half-dozen friends with ties to WikiLeaks is a matter that has not escaped authorities,’’ he said. “There’s a whole lot of evidence pointing to the fact that it would have been very hard for him to act alone.’33

To the extent that Bradley Manning's defense might include the suggestion that Manning was manipulated by Wikileaks and/or Assange (the chat logs released by Lamo suggest quite clearly that Manning and Assange were in direct contact on a regular basis) it seems reasonable to expect that Wikileaks is likely to be exposed to that accusation and the attendant criminal liability for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 793.34

Going back to the famous "Collateral Murder" video, one wonders if the act of decrypting this video (it was purportedly leaked by Manning in encrypted form) constitutes participation in the theft of the data itself to the extent required to trigger inchoate, or even direct liability. Wikileaks provided a clear roadmap to their complicity here via their Twitter feed:

Have encrypted videos of US bomb strikes on civilians... we need super computer time....35

This may go a long way to explaining the recent interest by the military and the FBI in members of the community at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Its Own Worst Enemy?

As seems typical of the self-destructive bent Wikileaks appears determined to exhibit, one of the most dangerous institutions for Wikileaks sources would seem to be... Wikileaks. Consider:

Adrian Lamo, the former hacker, told The Daily Beast in an interview that he began analyzing the huge library of classified information about the war in Afghanistan immediately after its release by WikiLeaks on Sunday. On Monday, he said, he alerted Pentagon criminal investigators to technical markings on the documents that would allow them to identify exactly which Defense Department computer databases had been used to store the information.36

This passage seems to have Lamo suggesting that Wikileaks failed to scrub the Afghanistan data sufficiently to prevent it tracing directly back to Manning, who languished in military detention even as Wikileaks proceeded to release the data. This does not bode well for Wikileaks should the Manning defense wish to attempt to implicate it.

But even in the midst of all this fog of information war, might Wikileaks be begging for prosecution in other areas? The news that Wikileaks has salted a number of its releases with encrypted files labeled "insurance"37 suggests that the organization believes it might prevent arrest or prosecution of its founder or other senior officials by threatening the release of even more embarrassing documents or data should evil befall them. This tactic, termed "graymail," is of questionable utility in the instant case and may trigger liability under federal blackmail statutes. To wit:

Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing....38

Graymail is normally only fruitful when the defendant in a case possesses classified or otherwise embarrassing information acquired lawfully over the course of his or her duties or work. The revelation of graymail data is through the mechanism of the rules of evidence and the Due Process clause- which is why the lawyers and defendants using such tactics avoided indictment under federal blackmail statutes.

If Wikileaks expects that encrypted data released into the wild represents an effective deterrent its officers may be in for a bit of a surprise, not to mention that the Classified Information Protection Act of 1980 (hereinafter the "CIPA")39 provided for in camera review of such material by a judge before disclosure of the material thus effectively killing the utility of graymail as a defense tactic.

Is it Even Safe to Leak to Wikileaks Anymore?

Given the literal riot of theories of liability that seem to attach to the conduct of Wikileaks (not to mention the fact that Wikileaks appears to be under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement along with the U.S. Army investigators have begun to make it a habit of detaining at the border certain associates of Mr. Assange, searching their laptops and asking if such associates happen to know where Mr. Assanage is just now)40 future leakers might well want to consider not just the demonstrated ineptitude of the Wikileaks crowd in protecting its sources, but the fact that, should Wikileaks or Assange find themselves indicted or searched at the border, any material, logs, chat sessions, IP records or testimony from cooperating witnesses as they bend to prosecutorial pressure one by one, are all likely to make Wikileak sources a bit more popular than they expected to be.

Wikileaks is simply too cute for its sources (or its own) good.

  1. 1. See e.g., Ann Woolner, "WikiLeaks Secret Records Dump Stays in Legal Clear," Bloomberg (July 27, 2010); Joshua E. Keating, "Could Julian Assange Be Prosecuted for the Afghan War Logs?" Foreign Policy (July 30, 2010).
  2. 2. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 et seq.
  3. 3. See: Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
  4. 4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(c)
  5. 5. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)
  6. 6. New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
  7. 7. 18 U.S.C. § 793(g)
  8. 8. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 219-237 (2007).
  9. 9. 18 U.S.C. § 641
  10. 10. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 230 (2007).
  11. 11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426.
  12. 12. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
  13. 13. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
  14. 14. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 232 (2007).
  15. 15. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
  16. 16. 532 U.S. 514 (2001) Footnote 19 (Citing Branzberg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
  17. 17. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company, 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
  18. 18. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
  19. 19. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 233 (2007).
  20. 20. Stephen I. Vladeck, "Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press," Harvard Law and Policy Review, Volume 1, 233 (2007).
  21. 21. John Goetz "I Enjoy Crushing Bastards," Der Spiegel (July 26, 2010).
  22. 22. Julian Assange (writing as ""), "Conspiracy as Governance," (December 3, 2006). Local copy available here. The New Yorker first attributed the work to Assange in its June 7, 2010 profile of him, and the indomitable Cryptome republished a segmented version of this document on July 31, 2010.
  23. 23. Julian Assange (writing as ""), "Conspiracy as Governance," (December 3, 2006).
  24. 24. Kevin Poulsen, "U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in Wikileaks Video Probe," Wired (June 6, 2010).
  25. 25. "Leaker Defends Release of Names," The Australian (July 30, 2010).
  26. 26. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e).
  27. 27. Peter Preston, "Wikileaks Afghan Story Raises Dilemma Over Safety of Sources," The Guardian (August 1, 2010).
  28. 28. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
  29. 29. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
  30. 30. Clint Hendler, "The Story Behind the Publication of Wikileaks' Afghanistan Logs," Columbia Journalism Review (July 28, 2010).
  31. 31. Peter Preston, "Wikileaks Afghan Story Raises Dilemma Over Safety of Sources," The Guardian (August 1, 2010).
  32. 32. Philip Shenon, "The Pentagon's Wikileaks Breakthrough," The Daily Beast (July 29, 2010).
  33. 33. David Abel, "MIT Graduate Admits Link in Leak Case," The Boston Globe (August 1, 2010).
  34. 34. 18 U.S.C. § 793(g).
  35. 35. Wikileaks Twitter feed (January 8, 2010).
  36. 36. Philip Shenon, "The Pentagon's Wikileaks Breakthrough," The Daily Beast (July 29, 2010).
  37. 37. Kim Zitter, "Wikileaks Posts Mysterious 'Insurance' File," Wired (July 30, 2010).
  38. 38. 18 U.S.C. § 873.
  39. 39. 18 U.S.C. App. III. §§ 1-16 (1980).
  40. 40. Elinor Mils, "Researcher Detained at U.S. Border, Questioned About Wikileaks," CNET (July 31, 2010).
[Art Credit: The Age "Julian Assange Outside Court in Melbourne," Photograph (1995), From the Author's Private Collection. A younger Julian Assange outside the court building in which he was later convicted of hacking offenses.]

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